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1 Introduction
The debate on security in Sri Lanka is dominated
by the traditional discourse of the security of the
state. Primacy is given to the question of how to
ensure state security from internal as well as
external threats. Notions such as human security
have had very little impact on mainstream
debates on security.
In recent times, these notions have consolidated
even more. An obvious reason has been the
separatist threat that the Sri Lankan state has
been facing from Tamil ethno-nationalism.
During the initial stages of Tamil self-assertion,
the Tamil demand for a separate state was
articulated through democratic means. But soon
the Tamil political movement transformed into
an armed conflict with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) becoming the dominant
armed group. The LTTE developed into an armed
organisation with infrastructural facilities
resembling those of a regular militarised force. In
addition to armed cadres, it developed
capabilities in the sea and more recently in the
air. It also styled itself as a regular armed force
with ranks, insignia, etc. On top of this, the LTTE
attempted to develop institutions resembling a
state in the area where they were in control.
These developments contributed to making the
threat to state security a reality on the ground.
The Tamil struggle for separation
internationalised very quickly, and the activities
of the Tamil diaspora played a critical role in this
process. The war forced a large section of the
Tamil population to migrate and settle mainly in
Europe, the USA and Australia. Over the years,
this population became a formidable force in
support of the separatist struggle. In addition,
the Sri Lankan government has been under
pressure from foreign governments and
numerous international organisations to settle
the conflict through negotiations. Among these
governments, India, the regional power in South
Asia, played a critical role. Finally, the overall
context of globalisation within which the Sri
Lankan state has had to operate has contributed
to the internationalisation of Sri Lanka’s
conflict. Consequently, these factors enhanced
the perception that the Sri Lankan state was
under threat.
The main reaction to both these trends – the
separatist challenge spearheaded by a
militarised LTTE and pressure from forces
emanating from outside the state – within Sri
Lanka has been to strengthen the discourse of
state security even more. This has been the
dominant idea, especially within the majority
Sinhala population and mainstream political
parties. Currently, the Sri Lankan state, making
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use of these dominant sentiments, is waging a
relatively successful military campaign against
the LTTE.
Given this context, it is extremely difficult even
to begin a discussion on new ideas of security.
Many of the activities that are being conducted
under the rubric of security sector reforms in
this environment give the impression of being
donor-driven projects that depend on the
continuous interest of donors. The flipside of this
comment is that these activities do not have a
sufficient social and political base within the
country so as to become an integral part of Sri
Lanka’s social transformation. There is a real
danger that this type of activity could proliferate
without a real contribution to the security of the
population.
The central argument in this article is that if Sri
Lanka is to begin a discussion on new ideas on
security, discourse needs to be grounded in a
range of issues that generate insecurity for the
majority of the population. The dialogue needs
to go beyond narrow technocratic ideas of
security sector reform and focus on structures
and processes that generate insecurity. As I shall
argue in this article, this essentially means
extending the current debates on state reform to
include the question of social exclusion. Current
debates on state reform focus on promoting a
market economy, devolution of power in order to
resolve the ongoing conflict and institutional
design for depoliticising state institutions under
the rhetoric of good governance. However, there
is very little effort to address what all this means
for the socially excluded. Rethinking state
reform with social exclusion as a central concern
is essential if state reform is to contribute to the
stability and security of Sri Lankan society.
2 Capital, coercion and social exclusion in post-
1977 Sri Lanka
In his seminal work on state formation, Charles
Tilly uses two categories: capital and coercion, to
analyse different trajectories of European state
formation. In his categorisation, capital occupies
‘the realm of exploitation, where the relations of
production and exchange themselves yield
surpluses, and capitalists capture them’ (Tilly
1992: 17). Coercion defines the realm of
domination. ‘The means of coercion centre on
armed forces, but extend to facilities for
incarceration, expropriation, humiliation and
publication of threats’ (Tilly 1992: 19). Although
the trajectories of state formation in countries
like Sri Lanka have a history different from that
of the European experience, these two categories
of capital and coercion, in the way they are
defined by Tilly, are useful for understanding the
nature of the state and social exclusion in
contemporary Sri Lanka.
Our analysis begins in 1977. In the post-colonial
history of Sri Lanka, the general election held in
July 1977 was an important turning point. The
centre-right United National Party (UNP)
government, elected to power during that
election, undertook a series of policy changes
that shifted the Sri Lankan economy in a
direction that gave emphasis to the markets,
private sector and a greater degree of openness
to the global economy. These were steps that
were essential for strengthening capitalist
relations in the economy and satisfying demands
of capital.
However, this point also signified the
deterioration of the relations between Sri
Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan state. While
the centre-right UNP, making use of their
massive electoral victory in July 1977 to promote
a plan to significantly shift the economy for the
benefit of capital, the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), the principal electoral
representatives of Tamils, contested the elections
asking for a mandate from the Tamil people to
form a separate state. This was a culmination of
a series of developments, starting immediately
after independence, which alienated the Tamil
population from the Sri Lankan state.1
These twin processes of trying to promote a
capitalist economy on the one hand, and
responding to Tamil demands for self governance
on the other, have determined the dynamics of
state reform and social exclusion in post-1977 Sri
Lanka. It is essential to understand these two
critical processes in order to promote a new
discussion on state reform that takes social
exclusion into account.
2.1 Capital and social exclusion
The demands of capital have brought about far-
reaching changes in the structure of the Sri
Lankan state. The most important of them have
been the establishment of a presidential system
of government and a proportional representation
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system of elections to choose the legislature. The
political objective of both these reforms was to
manage the populist social pressures that are
channelled through the legislature. Managing
these pressures was essential to take forward the
economic reform agenda. The presidency created
a body that was elected directly, enjoying powers
to take decisions on the economy independent of
the legislature. The proportional representation
system was expected to bring individual
members of the parliament under the control of
the party machinery to a greater degree than in
the former electoral system where they had more
autonomy (Bastian 2003; Wilson 1980).
Long before these reforms were implemented,
the architect of these ideas, the first president of
Sri Lanka, J.R. Jayawardena, argued the need for
such reforms in order to carry out unpopular
economic policies. His vision was one of a
powerful presidency that could make critical
decisions and create a stable parliament in which
members could be controlled by the two main
political parties (Jayawardena 1979). The
political outcomes of both these steps have been
different from what was envisaged. In other
words, there was a clear gap between
institutional design and the political outcomes.
But a point to be emphasised is that one of the
key objectives of the establishment of both these
critical institutions that govern Sri Lanka today
was furthering the interests of capital.
In addition to establishing totally new political
institutions, Sri Lanka has undertaken a number
of other reforms to reduce the role of the state in
the economy. These are steps that have become
familiar in many other parts of the world. The
critical ones are reducing the interventionist role
of the state in determining prices, privatisation
of state-owned enterprises and opening up of the
economy (Dunham and Abeysekera 1987;
Lakshman 1997; Kelegama 2004; Sarvananthan
2005).
However, this reform process has not been
smooth. Sections of the political class,
bureaucracy, some of the left-oriented political
groups and even ideologues of Sinhala
nationalism have campaigned against state
reforms. As a result some of the major reforms
have not been carried out or have been
implemented half-heartedly. For example, in
1987, a committee, established to bring about
reforms in the public sector, published its
findings and recommendations for reforms
(Administrative Reforms Committee 1987). But
very few of these recommendations have been
implemented.
Similarly, there has been resistance against
privatisation of a number of state-owned
institutions, although this has been demanded
both by local interests and international aid
agencies. The Public Enterprise Reforms
Commission (PERC), the body responsible for
privatisation, was established in 1986. By the
time it was dissolved in 2004, 98 state-owned
ventures had been privatised. But there has been
resistance to further privatisation. The critical
areas that remain in need of some type of reform
are the Ceylon Electricity Board, Ceylon
Petroleum Corporation, Government Railways,
state-owned roads and railway transport and
state-owned banks.
Therefore, despite the dominance of market-
oriented policies for the past three decades, the
Sri Lankan state has not shrunk. In a report
published in 1999, the World Bank declared that:
Sri Lanka’s public sector is large, costly and
suffers from low effectiveness and efficiency.
With 12 percent of its labour force employed
in the government in 1999 (17 percent if the
semi-government sector is included), the
country has the largest bureaucracy per capita
in Asia. (World Bank 2000: 21)
Despite the limitations of the reform process and
a more than two decade-old civil war,
liberalisation of the economy has resulted in
reasonable economic growth. 
Sri Lanka has achieved three decades of
sustained growth, averaging 4.9 percent
annually since 1977. In conjunction with
modest population growth, this has resulted in
doubling of the per capita incomes over the
past two decades to over $1600 in 2007.
(World Bank 2008: 5)
In recent years, the growth has been robust:
7.7 per cent and 6.8 per cent in 2006 and 2007,
respectively. The structure of the economy has
undergone a shift away from the dominance of
agriculture. Industry and services dominate the
economy. Foreign exchange earnings are
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dominated by industrial exports and remittances
from the global labour market.
Basically, the economy’s performance shows that
it has been opened up for capitalist accumulation
and that the private sector has performed even in
the midst of the intra-state conflict. A particular
regional distribution of the economy has helped.
Around half the gross domestic product (GDP) is
concentrated in the Western Province close to the
capital. The districts that cover the south-western
quadrant of the country account for the bulk of
the economic activities. This means that even if
there is a war in the North/East, the economy
could perform reasonably well if there was
stability in these areas. Of course, there are
opportunity costs of the war. If a peaceful
settlement could be found, the performance of
the economy would certainly be much improved.
On the social side, the country is displaying
typical characteristics of societies where the
impact of markets has become widespread.
Despite numerous state as well as non-state
interventions on poverty alleviation,
consumption poverty was estimated to be around
23 per cent in 2002. This was estimated by the
last Household and Income Survey – the official
source for poverty measurement (World Bank
2007). However, this survey did not take into
account the war that affected the North and
East. Hence, it was likely that the poverty
indicators should have been worse.
Inequality is as high as ever. The same Household
and Income Survey of 2002 concluded that the
highest two income deciles together account for
more than half of the total income (53.7 per
cent), while the lowest five deciles (i.e. the lower
half of the total income deciles) account for only
about one-fifth (19.6 per cent) of the total income
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2003: 20).
The operation of markets and the shrinking
proportion of agriculture in the economy signify
a slow dismantling of rural livelihoods, especially
in the smallholder paddy sector where the bulk
of the rural population has been engaged. Even
in households that are classified for the purposes
of census as agricultural, a significant proportion
of income comes from wage labour.
By contrast, there is significant growth of a wage
earning class. Wage labour in sectors such as
garments and plantations and migrant labour to
the Middle East have become main sources of
surplus and foreign exchange. The bulk of this
labour is female. It is this working class that has
been generating the surplus for maintaining a
dysfunctional state and a costly war. Workers in
the estates still operate under labour regimes
characteristic of plantation production systems
that depend on the availability of cheap labour.
In many Middle Eastern countries, labour rights
are almost non-existent.
In short, although market economies are
spreading rapidly, the record of various strategies
to tackle social contradictions is very weak.
Safety nets have not worked. However much
there has been a proliferation of non-state sector
activities promoted by donors interested in
tackling these issues, they have not been
successful. Pro-poor growth, inclusive growth or
the other fashionable terms that donors employ
do not seem to provide solutions.
The real problem of Sri Lanka in the area of
social exclusion has been the inability of a
bloated and dysfunctional state to intervene on
behalf of the socially excluded in the context of
penetration of capitalist production relations.
This has been largely due to the undermining of
state capacity through patronage politics.
Since the period of liberal economy, ideological
differences between the two main parties on
economic policies have disappeared. In their
place has appeared a system of patronage
politics, where politicians seek power mainly to
ensure access to resources and influence that
state power provides. In this politics, the state
has become a means of accumulation as well,
dolling out patronage to supporters. Devoid of
ideological underpinnings, politicians move from
party to party in search of these opportunities to
access state power.
The particular proportional representation (PR)
system that has been instituted has complicated
this trend. Instead of the stability envisaged by
the designers of PR, what have prevailed are
coalition governments and frequent crossovers.
Therefore, in order to ensure stability of regimes
both coalition partners and various fractions of
ruling parties have to be satisfied. The outcome
has been jumbo-sized cabinets and proliferation
of state institutions. For instance, in 1999 there
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were 35 government ministries (World Bank
2000: 21). At one time, the current
administration had 26 cabinet ministers, 26 non-
cabinet ministers and 18 deputy ministers,
making a total of 70 ministers. There has not
been any significant reduction from these levels.
The biggest impact of this undermining of the
state has been on those sectors of the state that
are in charge of the delivery of social and welfare
services. In other words, while those parts of the
state responsible for promoting interests of
capital have functioned with some degree of
coherence, institutions responsible for taking care
of the socially excluded have been undermined.
In the absence of an effective state that can
intervene on behalf of the socially excluded,
organised action on behalf of these groups has
not resulted in many benefits. Sri Lanka has a
long tradition of trade unionism. Some of the
trade unions, especially in the plantation sector,
are still active and sometimes effective. But
there are many trade unions caught up in the
cancer of patronage politics. However, there is a
large section of the working class that is not
unionised. Further, Sri Lanka never had a
peasant movement that made a lasting mark on
the country’s politics.2 Many of the more recent
civil society interventions have had the character
of being isolated projects rather than attempts to
develop social movements that can influence
state policies.
2.2 Coercion and social exclusion
Alienation of the Tamil population from the Sri
Lankan state has been the most significant
dimension of social exclusion. The post-1977
period has been characterised by the worsening
of this relationship and a civil war. The record of
institutional reforms to meet the grievances of
the Tamil population during the same period has
been dismal. The only significant reform has
been the enactment of the 13th amendment to
the constitution in 1987, which established the
system of provincial councils with a certain
degree of devolved powers. However, the primary
mover in enacting these reforms was India and
not the Sri Lankan political class. The 13th
amendment was the result of several years of
pressure from India, starting from 1983. After
agreeing to implement the constitutional
amendment and establish provincial councils,
the Sri Lankan political class has undermined
implementation at every turn. The first
provincial council in the combined North/East
Province, which was the focus of the Tamil’s
demand for autonomy, lasted less than five
months. From this point onwards, there has been
no elected provincial council in the North/East.
The current administration, while waging a
military campaign against LTTE, has carried out
elections for the Eastern Provincial Council,
which has been separated from the combined
North/East council. However, whether this
council will gain legitimacy among the Tamil
population, and whether it will be an answer to
Tamil grievances, remains to be seen.
In the meantime, the coercive side of the Sri
Lankan state has been strengthened to meet the
armed threat from the LTTE. This has brought
far-reaching changes to Sri Lankan security
structures. On one hand, with its largely
ceremonial army, the military has become a
formidable force with an increased strength in
numbers as well as equipment. It has grown to a
force of approximately 115,000 personnel that
absorbs 4.5 per cent of the GDP.3 On the other
hand; it is also operating within an institutional
framework that, comparatively, gives it much
more power.
Formally, the security forces are under civilian
control. Constitutionally, they are placed under
the Minister of Defence. Normally, this post is
occupied by the executive – earlier the prime
minister and now the president. The president
controls security forces through the Ministry of
Defence. Usually the secretary to the Ministry of
Defence is a loyal bureaucrat. This has become a
strategy through which the political class
controls the security forces.
According to the constitution, the security sector
is accountable to parliament. But the degree to
which parliamentary mechanisms are utilised to
oversee the security sector is marginal. The
consultative committee in parliament dealing
with security forces is ineffective. Even when the
security forces become the subject of
parliamentary discussions, such as at the time of
budgetary discussions, there is very little scrutiny
of the security institutions.
This situation has been made worse by the
enactment of laws, which have enormously
expanded the powers of the security forces
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without mechanisms for accountability. For
example, starting from the early 1970s, when the
Sri Lankan state began to face violent
challenges, emergency regulations have become
the norm, rather than the exception. While
having formal structures of democratic rule, Sri
Lankans have lived under emergency rule for the
last three decades. In addition to this, Sri Lanka
has passed draconian laws like the Prevention of
Terrorism Act in 1979 and Prevention and
Prohibition of Specified Terrorist Activities
Regulation. These legislative enactments have
undermined human rights and created a climate
of impunity.
The activities of the coercive side of the state
and of various armed groups on the Tamil side
have had a devastating impact on the population.
The bulk of this impact has been on the Tamil
population in general and those living in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces in particular.
This has been recorded in numerous reports
compiled by human rights organisations, local as
well as foreign4 and includes the entire catalogue
of atrocities such as deaths, disappearances,
unlawful detentions, arrests, torture, etc. There
is now an entire generation of people
traumatised by war. Hundreds of thousands have
been displaced, sometimes several times. The
impact of the social and economic infrastructure
has been significant, contributing, along with the
other factors, to the exclusion of a significant
section of the population. Some have escaped
these conditions by migrating out of the war
zone. Others, mainly the poorer sections, have
continued to survive in the war-torn area mainly
through the support of humanitarian agencies.
Thus, the twin processes of penetration of
capitalist relations and action of the coercive
apparatus of the state have resulted in a
condition of insecurity for a large section of the
population. In both these dimensions, changes
that have taken place within the structure of the
state have been critical. When it comes to the
arena of capital, while the state has been
reformed to promote the interests of capital, it
has not been to been able to protect the socially
excluded from the negative impacts of the
market. On the coercive side, while the state has
undertaken a determined military effort to crush
the separatist armed groups, there have been
few institutional reforms to meet the grievances
of the Tamil population.
3 Rethinking state reform
The critical issue facing the Sri Lankan polity in
the context of widespread insecurity due to the
spread of capitalist relations and the impact of
coercive action of the state is how to move
beyond current orthodoxies of state reform. Such
orthodoxies of state reform do not possess the
fundamental ingredients necessary for tackling
the issue of social exclusion.
The current orthodoxies of state reform have the
following three elements:
1 Continued reform of the state to promote a
market economy
2 Devolution of power as a response to the
Tamil demand for autonomy
3 Institutional design to promote good
governance.
Continuation of the state reforms for promoting
a market economy is a discourse that is
promoted by many actors, such as mainstream
economists, business interests and major donors.
This has been a primary objective of policy-based
lending under structural adjustment. Donors
have withdrawn funding when these reforms
were not carried out. But this strategy does not
include any serious ideas for tackling the
problem of social exclusion.
The second area, that of devolution, has been
dominated by constitutional lawyers.
Consequently, there has been a seemingly endless
discussion about various devolution models found
in different parts of the world and the letter of the
law. An incredible amount of energy has gone into
this question without the actors asking what it
means for the socially excluded. This is not to
argue against devolution. At least the majority of
the Tamil population would welcome it as a
concession to their demands. So much blood has
flowed that it is very difficult to foresee a solution
that satisfies the Tamil population without some
form of genuine devolution, and the Sinhalese will
probably accept it if it brings peace to the country.
However, if devolution is to be something more
than an effort that consolidates the power of the
elite in the periphery, the discussion has to go
beyond the debate on institutional design, as at
present. The mere crafting of a new institution
within the entrenched structures of power does
not do much to improve the lot of the socially
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Notes
1 There is a significant volume of literature
covering various dimensions of this issue. For
an interesting recent contribution, see Nira
Wickramasinghe (2006).
2 See Moore (1985) for discussion of peasant
politics in Sri Lanka.
3 Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies,
www.ipcs.org
4 Perhaps the best recording of the plight of the
Tamil population has been done by the
University Teachers for Human Rights
(Jaffna), www.uthr.org
excluded. Empirical work in areas where
provincial councils currently exist will show this.
In many instances, what has happened is to
create a new vehicle of power for the peripheral
elite. What is more, the political objective of
many of these elites seems to be how to utilise
the provincial system in order to climb the
ladder to the centre.
Similar comments can be made on the third and
final area of state reforms – institutional design
to take care of issues such as politicisation of
state apparatus, accountability of state
institutions and impunity of security forces. It is
clear that many years of institutional design have
not had desired results on the ground.
Sometimes those in power have totally ignored
these institutions or they have been captured by
vested interests, rendering them ineffective. It is
pretty clear that the internal logic of the
institutional design itself will not deliver the
expected results.
Historical examples show that institutions that
are meant to regulate the behaviour of the state
become effective when social groups affected by
the institutions get organised and begin to make
use of them. The trade union movement of Sri
Lanka is a good example. It became effective not
only because new legislation conducive to its
establishment was passed in the mid-1950s, but
also because organisations were built making use
of the space created by institutional reform.
Without this element, these exercises of
institutional design have the characteristics of a
top-down approach and become a pastime of the
elite. There are many civil society efforts in
campaigning for these reforms, monitoring them
or carrying out training programmes about
them. On the other hand, there are hardly any
efforts to explore the links between these
institutions and self-organisations of the socially
excluded that could benefit from them or
promote such forms of self organisation.
The period of negotiations under the United
National Front (UNF) government conducted
during 2002–3 was a period when these ideas
enjoyed hegemony in the country. Continued
reform of the state to promote a market
economy, devolution through negotiations with
LTTE and good governance were the ideological
underpinnings of the UNF-led peace process.
They had strong support from the regime that
was in power, international aid agencies and civil
society actors who had been receiving
international assistance. It was the period of
triumph of existing orthodoxies of state reform.
The defeat of the UNF government in the
general elections of April 2004 demonstrated a
major flaw in this set of ideas. The UNF’s defeat
was largely due to the voting pattern of the
Sinhala electorate. There is no doubt that one of
the contributing factors to its defeat was the
complete absence of any ideas to tackle social
exclusion through economic reforms while taking
steps to promote the interest of capital. The
combination of this discontent, coupled with the
ideology of Sinhala nationalism, which opposed
negotiations with the LTTE, brought about the
UNF’s defeat. The missing ingredient was ideas
for state intervention so that the socially
excluded could benefit from a globalised market
economy.
To conclude, what we have tried to argue is that
the current orthodoxies on state reform have not
explored the links between these reforms and
the interests of the socially excluded. If this is
taken into account, there is room for expansion
of these debates. In our view, this is essential if
the current debates are to contribute towards
social stability and security.
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